07 February 2014

Thoughts on "Pluralism: the Future of Religion" by Kenneth Rose



In his interesting new book, Pluralism: the Future of Religion, Kenneth Rose, Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Christopher Newport University (full disclosure: I am a CNU alum and Ken was one of my instructors) argues that religious studies is in something of a crisis.  The theology of religions—which seeks to relate different religious traditions to Christianity and determine the relationships between these traditions, a notion in theory possible for any religious tradition based on revealed wisdom*—is, according to Rose, at an impasse.  Comparative religion, to which the theology of religions is necessarily prior, is similarly hobbled.

Theology of religions is at an impasse because current scholarship is based on a default position of inclusivism which, though it gives provisional value to non-Christian ideas, still has Christianity as its starting point and its normative model.  Though in form, this inclusiveness rejects the claims of exclusivity made by Christianity, Rose would have us see this as an illusion.  Such “inclusivism,” in his opinion, is simply a soft form of exclusivism, and no solution at all to the problems raised by the welter of competing religious claims. Since exclusive claims of truth are unsupportable in the modern world, this opens the door to pluralism, which has largely been rejected by the scholarly community as, ironically, exclusivistic. 

Pluralism, he suggests, sees “the availability of multiple bodies of internally plausible but malleable religious teachings as negating absolute claims for any of them.” (9)  Though he asserts that religions (note the plural) are attempting to understand something real, what he calls “an immaterial dimension of beatitude and deathlessness,” (12) the multitude of specific claims made by religious traditions, and the changes undergone by these traditions over their histories, provide sufficient reason to doubt that any one of them has the final word on the matter.  

As a counter to the older model of “cataphatic” pluralism, which simply piles attributes on to the sacred in order to make a more complete picture, Rose offers “apophatic” pluralism.  This views specific religious teachings as “a logical outcome of the cultural and historical conditions that necessarily limit every form of religious language.” (26)  It strips away all the symbols and attributes in favor of a direct encounter “with being, or the divine, free from the limited constructs generated by language, the mind, and culture.” (7)  Historical religions and their dogmas, in defining the sacred, necessarily limit it; each additional predicate attached to the sacred is a step away from experiencing it. 

Rose’s understanding of the historicity of religious traditions is very important to his argument, and is worth exploring here.  Though he rejects naturalistic theories of religions—such as those offered by David Sloan Wilson, Richard Sosis, and AraNorenzayan among others—which suggest that religion is an adaptation that aids reproductive success of individuals and helps bind groups together, his theory of religious change is evolutionary.  He further denies that the religious realm is accessible to the natural sciences at all and rejects compromise positions such as Stephen Jay Gould’s “non-overlapping magisteria” since Rose sees in reaity no “mental and physical dimensions that are entirely distinct from one another.” (153)

Religions change, according to Rose, as they come into contact with other religions.  Syncretism, which he suggests fosters hybridity and multiple religious identity, also dismantles old identities and creates new ones in a process he calls departicularization.  Through this process, apparently unchanging religious traditions are seen to change with exposure to new religious ideas and religious others.  It’s hard not to see them as organisms swapping genes, or perhaps memes, and becoming new.  Thus old religions pass on and new ones are created.  This is a process he sees intensifying as, through globalization, disparate communities are brought into closer and closer contact.

Recognition of this is important because, as Rose argues, “[i]f human societies continue integrating at the current pace, no religious tradition will be able to maintain nonnegotiable…claims except at the cost of cutting off solidarity with other human beings and by retreating into ever narrower and tragically doomed forms of fundamentalism.” (129)  It is here and in his writing on syncretism that Rose’s argument is at its strongest.  And no wonder—the very forces of modernity that are accelerating the processes of syncretism and departicularization are those that gave rise to the forces of religious fundamentalism, and its retreat into tribalism.  

I am sympathetic to much of Rose’s argument here, as the processes he describes as effecting religious change are not out of line with my own naturalistic understanding of religion.  We can disagree on whether there is a divine “real” behind all the appearances because we agree that, if such a real exists, it is inacessible to science and, ultimately, makes no claims about the natural world.  We can also agree that the religious traditions that attempt to describe this real, or that attempt to give the imprimatur of supernatural authority to natural processes, are products of history.  Both apophatic pluralism and naturalism reveal these as efforts to name something that is unnameable either because it is ineffable or because it doesn’t exist.  Which it is in the end is, ultimately, important only to individuals and not in some larger, cosmic sense.

But this agreement makes Rose’s rejection of Gould’s NOMA perplexing.  In proposing NOMA Gould sought to exempt the “moral truths” of religion from scientific enquiry and to exempt the discoveries of the sciences from religious scrutiny.  Science, as Gould said, gets“the age of rocks and religion retains the rock of ages; we study how the heavens go, and they determine how to go to heaven.” Gould, like Rose, would also deny any bifurcation between mental and physical realms, but conclude that both areapparent phenomena of the natural world amenable investigation by scientists.  But, so long as the claims of the mystic, or of the practitioner of everyday religion, do not extend to the physical properties of the universe, a NOMA-embracing scientist (or atheist) can say little about them.

Another point of concern is that Rose’s apophatic pluralism, while a powerful model for the academic study of religion, seems unlikely to have much impact among everyday religious believers.  Though undoubtedly correct in his assertion that “no religious community can preserve its language against change and decay forever,” (68) he also notes that those relying on authority and tradition will reject pluralist ideas.  

This, it seems, is where a large number of believers, at least in the Abrahamic traditions, live, in communities whose theologies range from conservative to fundamentalist.  Conservative theoogians will stress the authority of tradition and scripture, while fundamentalists will stress scriptures alone, interpreted literally.  Though there have always been liberal and conservative exegetical traditions, the encounter with modernity has given special impetus to fundamentalism especially in Protestant Christianity and Islam.  

That this fundamentalism is ahistorical in that it does not represent the normative experience of the majority of believers across time, and is entirely a product of modernity, is not understood by those embracing it. Fundamentalist believers live, as it were, in an eternal present, where the parameters of their religion as they understand it stretch back to the beginning of time and forward to the eschaton.  Historical forms of their faith, the majority of lived religious life, are viewed as defective forms at best, heterodoxy at worst.  Sectarian educational systems that turn out fundamentalist theologians seem unlikely to be touched by pluralist notions.

Indeed, the ongoing creative tension within even non-fundamentalist religious traditions between orthodoxy and heterodoxy seems to work against pluralism as well.  While syncretism is a feature of religions and not a bug, so, too, is the retreat into orthodoxy when confronted with novelty.  Heterodox ideas force proponents of orthodoxy to better refine their arguments and their dogmas, and build higher walls against outside encroachment.  Though their positions may represent a compromise with heterodox ideas, the guardians of orthodoxy will, like fundamentalists, maintain that their position represents a true transmission of the faith and is catholic in its reach (see, e.g., Henderson, The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy)

More’s the pity.  Rose has presented a view of religious pluralism that seems to cast a wide enough net to draw in all of those who believe, as he does, in a higher-order reality that is a source of meaning.  That it makes no demands of its believers, that it offers no insights into physical creation, that it is inclusive of multiple religious traditions while privleging none, makes it a true middle ground of faith. 

These same characteristics, however, seem to portend, at least for the non-mystic, an anodyne faith.  The very traits that render a religion unoffensive to non-believers may rob it of its snap for those who believe.  If we agree with Rose’s assertion that “as long as human experience remains marked by finitude, loss, and suffering, religions will continue to thrive in unforeseeable varieties among us, for just so long as it speaks about a condition of beatitude that escapes the bounds of death,” (149) then we should also assume that religious believers will be looking for concrete answers to these problems and concrete promises of the world to come.  So once again, the predicates come pouring out and the cycle continues.

* Thanks, Ken, for the note of clarification.

13 December 2013

The Atheism Problem in American Politics



In an interesting new article on Politico, author and atheist Jennifer Michael Hecht suggests that the election of atheists is the last political taboo in the United States.  Part of the problem lies with American voters, who are less willing to vote for atheists than for members of any other group tested.  Indeed, no sitting member of Congress, and only a handful of politicians at the state or local level, is willing to self-identify as an atheist.  Hecht contrasts this with the situation in 19th-century America, or even early in the 20th century, when deists like Jefferson and Madison, or people of ambiguous or uncertain religiosity like Lincoln or Taft, could rise to the highest office in the land.  Since the Cold War, she argues, religiosity has been increasingly prevalent in American politics, bringing us to this current situation.

While I think the Cold War is an important touchstone, the issue of atheists facing roadblocks in politics goes farther back than that.  Though the presidents she identifies had non-conventional religious beliefs, they each paid at least lip-service to a higher power.  They were participants in the great American Civil Religion which, I have noted elsewhere, was an idea most associated with the late sociologist Robert Bellah.  It comprises a set of references to God that in theory unties Americans in higher purpose.  Ultimately the aim is to insure, as it says on the Great Seal of the United States, that “[God] looks with pleasure on our new order of the ages.”

So, we have “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, “in God we trust,” on our currency, “God Bless You; God Bless America,” at the end of nearly every political speech, “God Bless America” sung in the seventh inning stretch.  While the instance of these certainly increased with the Cold War, the putative deity has always been lurking in the background of American public discourse.  Indeed only one inaugural address, Washington’s second given in 1797—a marvel of efficiency, it is only fourteen words longer than this paragraph—has failed to mention God, or Divine Providence, or the Almighty Being.  Most sought his aid and protection for the nation, guidance in our affairs, and invoked his generosity towards the American people.

Small wonder, then, that atheism is a problem in American politics.  The charge was often hurled against Jefferson, and its inability to keep him from the presidency is more a testament to the state of party politics in the early 19th century than to general broad-mindedness.  Today the charge, were it substantiated, would be a political death sentence.  In eschewing belief in God, one opts out not only of formal religion, but of the American Civil Religion as well, and its relaxed central tenet that what one believes is not so important as that one believes.

A small consideration for atheists.  But not, it turns out, to most religious believers.  As I have discussed elsewhere, outward religiosity serves as a marker of trustworthiness for many believers.  There are reasons in deep time for this, stretching back to the very origins of belief in deities.  Belief in gods, it has been argued, arose as an efficient method for policing morals in groups.  Outsourcing this duty to deities was a good way to free up energies of members of the group towards the business of survival.  Outward appearances of religiosity serve as markers of membership in the group, that one can be trusted.

This even extends to very cosmopolitan societies.  Roman society, for instance, was as the historian Ramsay MacMullen noted “complete, and completely tolerant, in heaven as on earth.”  Religious authorities went to great pains to assimilate the gods of conquered territories to Roman gods.  Even the Jews frequently got a pass (except when they were actively rebelling), as the Romans respected the antiquity of their faith and chief among Roman religious virtue was adherence to the beliefs of one’s fathers.  Christians, however, were trouble.  They had left Judaism or—as Gentiles converted—traditional pagan religions, a most impious act.  Worse still, they denied the existence of all other gods leading to accusations of…wait for it…atheism.  Occasionally targeted for persecution, they were suspected of disrupting religious harmony and bringing the disfavor of the gods upon the empire.

When in the fourth century Constantine legalized Christian worship, he declared in the Edict of Milan that each person should pursue “that religion which he should think best for himself, so that the Supreme Deity (to whose worship we freely yield our hearts) may show in all things His usual favor and benevolence.”  This supreme deity would be the same one worshiped by educated pagans of the time, and would be adored, even by Christians, for the good of the empire.  Constantine’s restoration of goods and buildings seized from Christians in the recent persecution, and the financing of new church construction, was accompanied by investment in pagan temples, presumably in pursuit of his stated goal.  His attempt was to rehabilitate Christians of the charge of atheism and to restore the unity in heaven that had existed before.

So it goes even now.  Historically, of course, Christianity became a dominant force in the empire and in its successor states, and famously intolerant of competitors.   This intolerance was transmitted, in varying degrees, to the colonies that formed the United States.  Even though the Constitution stipulates that there be no religious test for public office, religiosity remains for many a marker of trustworthiness.  Is there nothing to be done?

Yes.  The same researchers who asserted this connection between religiosity and trustworthiness also note that reminders of secular governance can help ease the distrust.  Apparently, being reminded of membership in a larger group (e.g. American citizens) can downplay the “tribal” distrust of believers for non-believers.  I believe a version of this same phenomenon underlies the polarizing politics of the moment, which sees the unraveling of rights gains made by women and minorities.  Atheists do not appear to have the same problems in thoroughly secularized nations. 

Whether reminders of secular authority can convince atheists to trust believers more has not, to my knowledge, been explored.  One suspects the mistrust is returned, and for similar reasons.

However, the very fact that this mistrust can be mitigated suggests a path forward—secularism.  For those problems which have political solutions, in fact, secularism is the best answer for atheists and for believers.  It allows government to deal with religious and non-religious actors equally, and provides a middle path between theocracy and strict separationism.  It speaks to the aspirations not only of non-believers, but of the faithful who are wary of government entanglement with the personal questions of faith.  

It also requires respect.  Religious secularists must respect the right of the non-religious not to believe.  Non-religious secularists must respect the right of the religious to believe.  The goal of a society where all can pursue their aspirations is much more important than purity of belief (or non-belief).  Secularism requires a sort of philosophical laissez-faire when religious and non-religious people work towards common goals.  As far as is practicable—and there will be points where the groups simply cannot agree—secularism is a path we must walk together.  

There are several reasons for this.  Religious belief is not going anywhere, and the ranks of believers far outnumber non-believers.  Were we, as atheists and assorted non-believers, to engage only those with whom we agree, we would quickly notice that it’s always the same old people in the conversation and would achieve nothing but our own frustration.  Working with the faithful, we can build alliances with those who share our goals, marginalizing the reactionary forces seeking to impose religious strictures (ham-handed attempts at proselytizing the atheist message, at arguing believers out of their beliefs, do not help us in this regard).  

If any creed can join us, it is the message of equality contained in our founding documents and which has been the most contested idea in the public arena.  It is the concern for the future shared by all of us, religious and non-religious.  Secularism has been our greatest strength and can be again.  Embracing its value decreases the value of religious belief (or non-belief) in the political realm, making it possible for atheists to openly serve their fellows, in order to build a more perfect Union.

26 October 2013

Enough with the quotes, already!



"The thing about quotes on the internet is that you cannot confirm their validity."Abraham Lincoln


Honest Abe, had he ever actually been able to utter those words, would have been uncharacteristically wrong.  It turns out that, for the most part, it’s embarrassingly easy to verify quotes on the Internet.  The big obstacle is the desire to do it.  Just type the quote, or a few choice words from it, into a Google search and among your top ten searches (after the quote sites, about which more later) chances are someone has either confirmed or debunked it.

The ease of checking makes the proliferation of bogus quotes in arguments that much more troubling.  We’ve all seen them on Facebook or Twitter.  They come with a placard featuring a picture or painting of Famous Individual.  Over this background, usually in some era-appropriate script, come the words of wisdom:


“A free people ought not only to be armed and disciplined, but they should have sufficient arms and ammunition to maintain a status of independence from any who might attempt to abuse them, which would include their own government.”  George Washington


Rock on, General Washington!  Take that, anti-gun pansies!  The ultimate unimpeachable source has just confirmed that the founders themselves saw the right to keep and bear arms as a bulwark against the tyranny of the government they worked so hard to create.  This quote scores on a number of points: it confirms an individual, as opposed to collective, right to keep and bear arms; it plays on the well-attested suspicion the Framers had of centralized authority; it strikes out against the putative gun-grabbers in modern days.

There’s only one gaping flaw in this.  Washington never, ever, as far as can be determined, uttered such words.  The words he did utter on this topic, the words that someone has altered, the ones that come from his first State of the Union message, are as follows:


“Among the many interesting objects which will engage your attention that of providing for the common defense will merit particular regard. To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.
A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is requisite; and their safety and interest require that they should promote such manufactories as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly military, supplies.
The proper establishment of the troops which may be deemed indispensable will be entitled to mature consideration. In the arrangements which may be made respecting it it will be of importance to conciliate the comfortable support of the officers and soldiers with a due regard to economy.”
 This quote is completely different.  Yes, there is the idea of an armed populace, but one that is disciplined, it seems, by government, giving perhaps a little backup to those who argue that the Second Amendment places the right to keep and bear arms in the context of a militia.  This armed populace is to be ready for war and has some connection to the legitimate armed forces.  Washington was not suggesting that the people be ready to take arms against a tyrannical government.

Such quotes abound.  Washington is extremely popular for obvious reasons: he was the “father of the country;” he is seemingly above partisan affiliation; he argued that America should remain as aloof as possible from the affairs of other nations.  But all of the founding generation is liable to turn up on your feed supporting one position or another.  Most often, these are positions associated with the political right or libertarians (though the left is not immune).

What’s going on here?  Why are these spurious quotations getting circulated and why do those sharing them never seem abashed when called out on it?

To find the answer we must look to our charged political environment.  Since the end of the Cold War, in the absence of an existential threat from outside, we have turned more viciously on one another.  As the last few elections have shown, the electorate is deeply, and narrowly, divided, and the needle doesn’t move far in either direction.  Any tool that might lend an advantage is one that will be used.

The founders of the United States can be deployed in this way.  It is unusual for a nation to have historical founders, people whose names have been signed to documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, people whose thoughts we can access through voluminous writings.  Since the American Revolution, the founding generation has been elevated to near godlike status in the American imagination, mostly on the strength of their propaganda.  We accept their argument that they were freedom-loving patriots fighting a cruel tyranny.  

This conditioning lends their words particular weight in political discussions.  There is a strain of thought that suggests the arc of American history since the founding is one of decadence, as we move farther and farther from the ideals of the framers.  It is hard not to look at the disputes among the founding generation—over the ratification of the Constitution, over the type of nation we would have, over the extension of the franchise, over the initial party split—and not see the present moment predicted.

And, we should be fair, they said a great many wonderful things.  Who would not be stirred by the first section of the Declaration of Independence and its radical claim that “all men are created equal?”  The endurance of the American republic can be offered as a testament to the strength of their vision.  But while we might justly praise this vision, we should also be aware of its limits.  We tend to think of the founders as anything other than the self-interested, elitist, political animals that they were.  We forget that, for the most part, they were afraid of democracy (there’s a reason that another bogus quote, this one attributed to Jefferson claiming, “Democracy is nothing more than mob rule, where 51% of the people may take away the rights of the other 49%” rings true).  In other words, they were just like us.  If you think politics today are dirty, look at the rhetoric employed in the election of 1800.

Because we see them as somehow different, more virtuous, possessing greater vision, we use quotes from famous people to support our positions.  We find them on quote sites that uncritically report quotes without providing proper attribution.  We accept them without question from partisan historians (e.g., the "historian" David Barton).  It's hard to resist giving our views the imprimatur of those wiser than us.

And when someone using the quote is called out, the response is usually an admission that the quote was passed along without research and a rejoinder along the lines of, “It doesn’t matter.  The words are true no matter who said them.”

If that’s the case, then why bother with the false attribution?  Is it because the words of Thomas Paine, voice of revolution, carry more weight than those of Michael Bazemore, professor of history and occasional blogger?  In a word, yes.  Quoting the founders, or anyone for that matter, in the service of the argument is simply an appeal to authority.  It is an attempt to win an argument without doing the work of logic, and a tacit admission that your point can't stand on its own.  Or, even worse, to win by cheating, by fabricating quotes, in a transparent attempt to give one’s own words added weight by placing them in the mouths of others.  Passing them along makes one an accessory to the dishonesty.   

This practice of appealing unthinkingly to authority, and accepting its pronouncements (true or fabricated) as evidence poisons debate.  It substitutes sound bites for reasoned thought.  In other words, the quote does what posters intend it to do.  For all intents and purposes deploying authoritative quotes is a means of closing debate, to say, as it were, "George Washington said it, I believe it, end of story." The tragedy is, with all due respect to Internet Lincoln, that it’s easy to confirm the validity of Internet quotes, to puncture the bubble of respectability . It takes only a few keystrokes and a desire for the truth.