Showing posts with label American Civil Religion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label American Civil Religion. Show all posts

29 August 2016

Colin Kaepernick and the American Civil Religion

If this were fifteen years ago, one might bemoan the trees that had died to publish the multitude of opinions on the Colin Kaepernick affair.  Fortunately this is the age of the Internet, and though I’m sure the electricity that has powered the debates has some non-zero effect on global warming, the habitat loss and deforestation is at least mitigated by the fact that those debates are mostly taking place in the virtual world.  For those who have been living under a rock, the short version is this: on August 26th, prior to a pre-season game, San Francisco 49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick refused to stand for the Star-Spangled Banner. 

Response was immediate and, as you might predict, ran from  outrage to praise.  Kaepernick’s explanation, that he sat because he had no wish to “stand up and show pride in a flag for a country that oppresses black people and people of color,” has struck all the nerves you would expect in a polarized political environment where the simple statement that Black Lives Matter has to be followed up with All Lives Matter, Blue Lives Matter and, in the newly-ascendant alt-right, White Lives Matter. 

Though most ordinary people seem to think he should have stood up, some have used the opportunity to point out the racist lines in the third stanza of the song (did you KNOW there was one?), which lends a little scholarly gravitas to Kaepernick’s argument, though there is as yet no indication whether he knew this when he made his gesture.

I’m not about to opine on this situation, any more than to say that I personally find most rituals a bit silly.  Who cares if Colin Kaepernick doesn’t want to stand for (or Gabby Douglas forgets to put her hand over her heart during) the national anthem?

Plenty of people it turns out.

Kaepernick (we will mostly leave Douglas out, as she has claimed her actions were accidental and there is no reason not to believe her) has performed a social sin of the highest order—he has declined to participate in a key ritual of our civil religion.  American Civil Religion, as I have written earlier concerning a controversy over the Pledge of Allegiance, is a set of references and symbols, often referring to a non-specific God, that are intended to recall us to a higher purpose for the nation.  Routine references to the Almighty in the Pledge, in the motto “In God We Trust,” in the invocation of “God bless America” in every political speech are related to this.

Indeed, the American Civil Religion is so prevalent, that I have come to suspect it is the chief sect of most Americans, superseding the cult many participate in on various Sabbaths. 

There are many rituals in the American Civil Religion, and one of the most common is the complex of rites surrounding the display of the American flag before public spectacles, especially sporting events.  Having the flag brought in by color guards, the march to the center of the field, the singing of the “Star-Spangled Banner” are acts of worship (unkindly, we might call them idolatry).  Through them, spectators are momentarily bound—the word “religion” probably originates in the Latin religare, “to bind”—to one another, members of one family.

When Colin Kaepernick declines to stand for the national anthem, he is declining to participate in the American Civil Religion.

Of course in America this shouldn’t be a problem.  The First Amendment to the Constitution secures for us all the right to participate (or not) in religious services, to speak (or not) as we choose.  But the real challenge Kaepernick presents is not one that is always amenable to logic.  Even in a relatively secular country like the United States religiosity, signaling religious belief, carries a great deal of importance.  

For reasons stretching deep into prehistory, religious display has evolved as a proxy marker for trustworthiness.  Religious people, speaking generally, trust other religious people, a phenomenon that it has been suggested is responsible for widespread distrust of atheists.  Since religiosity is a way of signaling, “Hey, you don’t know me, but you can trust me,” people who do not show religiosity are unconsciously signaling that they are not to be trusted.

This distrust is exactly why the responses to Kaepernick unfold as they do.  A small number of people, who have eschewed much display of faith in the American Civil Religion, don’t see the problem.  For larger numbers of people, who consider themselves patriots, who love the flag and all that they think it stands for, Kaepernick’s refusal to stand is nothing more than a wholesale rejection of their faith.  That’s why even a potentially accidental transgression like Douglas’ garners so much attention.  Because, even though religion is a proxy marker for trustworthiness, reminders of secular authority can mitigate the distrust of the non-religious.  Secular authority subsumes sectarian identity in the public sphere.

And the American Civil Religion is one of those “secular” authorities, one that is supposed to be the same for all Americans (though it, too, sometimes fails the non-religious).  What happens when Americans decline to participate in it?  

Watch the fallout from Colin Kaepernick’s actions to find out.


17 May 2016

Religion By Other Means: Politics and Ultimate Meaning

During this year’s odd primary cycle I have been moved many times to refer to the “movement” that has accreted around Vermont senator Bernie Sanders as something of a “cult.”  When I have made this criticism, it has usually stemmed from the vitriol of Sen. Sanders’ supporters whenever any criticism is launched at him.  This has been especially true when he has engaged in the naked sort of politicking that he and his supporters have criticized rival Hillary Clinton for.  Whenever the foibles of the leader are pointed out, supporters can be counted on to reply that it’s different for Bernie, that when he does the things that other politicians do, he’s not really doing the things that other politicians do.  Such rationalization seems like the adoration cult followers give to their leaders, who are so self-evidently right that, when we see them doing wrong, the fault is not in them but ourselves.

Yet the more I thought about it, the less surprised I was, because I am increasingly convinced that politics, at least in the United States, is simply religion by other means.  I think it may be argued that every political movement in the United States and Western Europe is a Christian heresy of sorts, a point I am not prepared to press here.  But I am prepared to offer a provisional argument on the issue of politics as religion, and to offer some preliminary thoughts of the place of groups like those supporting Sanders in it.

It is a truism on the left that religion and politics should forever be separate, just as it is a truism on the right that they should not.  On the left (and it is here that I place myself) the argument is that religion should have no part in the governance of a pluralistic nation and that secularism, government neutrality on issues of religion, should be the rule.  The right argues that we have become too secular, that we have fallen away from our religious underpinnings and that only by returning to them can we, to steal a phrase, make America great again.

I think both of these miss the point.

I’d like to suggest that, for many people, politics is religion.  This is not to argue that it has supplanted, for instance, the Christianity that so many Americans profess.  Rather, one runs alongside the other.  On the left, the tracks are skewed apart; on the right, they move towards an intersection. 

Most Americans are members, to varying degrees of both sects.  Such a situation is not unprecedented—it was faced by Rome as it expanded throughout the Mediterranean world and incorporated diverse peoples. Conquered people saw their pantheons assimilated to the Roman pantheon, becoming part of the larger Roman civil religion.  At the top was the imperial cult, centered on the living god in Rome and his divine predecessors.  As long as one did not commit the sin of atheism, the denial of any god, one could get along fairly well, and in day-to-day life follow the practices of their forebears (this was a positive thing; abandoning the religion of one’s forefathers was an act of impiety).*

Compare this to the civil religion of the United States.  Its gods are the Founding Fathers, agents of a supreme but ultimately unknowable and generic God, who bestows blessings on this country as long as we acknowledge divine providence in some non-specific fashion.  Its rituals are the Pledge of Allegiance, the national anthem at sporting events, and the ritual invocation of God at the end of every political speech.  America’s God is so non-specific that the gods of immigrants can be assimilated to it, much as the Roman pantheon absorbed the pantheons of conquered people.

Politics is the church of the American civil religion, and politicians are the clergy of it.  I don’t simply mean this metaphorically.  Since the eighteenth century we have increasingly used government to answer the sorts of questions traditionally answered by religion.  Not questions about the origin of the world or our place in the cosmos, but the questions of how our society should function and how we ought to relate to one another.   These are, in their way, questions of ultimate meaning, as they define the world we will live in.  Political language is the language we use to pose and answer these questions.  Founding documents, especially the Constitution, and the writings of the founding generation are its sacred texts, the texts we resort to and quote (or misquote) to make a particular point.

Our own political church has two main denominations, Democratic and Republican.  Like different Christian denominations there is a core dogma: professed belief in republicanism, some adherence to the notion of American exceptionalism, reverence for the Founding Fathers.  There are also differences, mostly centering around the interpretation of the sacred texts and the amount of lay participation that should be permissible.  Small wonder, then, that political fights can be so vitriolic; we are dealing with fundamental matters.  Each denomination views itself as the guardian of an unchanging orthodoxy that continues on in the tradition of the Republic’s founders, and denounces the other as heterodox.

Yet each major denomination is large enough that the other’s denunciations are largely irrelevant, just as a Catholic accusation of heterodoxy against, say, the Baptists would be.  Each can continue to compete for the votes of the laity, with elections deciding the result.  However, there are minority factions within each party for whom the charge of heresy bears some weight and the major denominations are left with the quandary of what to do with them.  In the tried and true fashion of Christianity, the parties generally try to co-opt their heretics, taking the best ideas and pushing those who will not be reconciled farther and farther to the margins.

This is where the libertarian wing of the Republican party was four years ago, before it morphed into the Tea Party movement and threatens to foment another schism in American politics through the nomination of Donald Trump.  It is also where the Bernie Sanders movement, if it can yet be called that, is now.  Guardians of Republican orthodoxy fought the Tea Party until they needed it.  Something similar might happen to the Democrats.

It’s not an accident, I think, that these two movements are so readily paired.  Both are characterized by their receptivity to a message of economic grievance, to a sense that the elites have sold them out and left them behind.  We might in this see the cry of late medieval parishioners who felt their soteriological needs were not met by absentee or illiterate clergy.  Grievance is surely the seedbed of revolutions.

Trump’s challenge to the Republican orthodoxy is the challenge that truly threatens a schism.  It is analogous to the Arian controversy that threatened to destroy attempts at Christian unity in the fourth century.  Paul Ryan, representing the orthodox party, has met with Trump in an attempt to restore unity.  How that ends we’ll have to wait to see.

Sanders’ challenge is different.  Drawing from a great many independents, it seems unlikely that he will create a schism among Democrats.  Going back to questions about cults earlier, I think that Sanders and his supporters are political Gnostics.  Gnosticism is a term used to describe a variety of ancient religious systems that emphasized a strict duality consisting of the material world and the spiritual world.  Christian Gnostics argued that an evil god, referred to as the Demiurge, created the world and the spiritual Jesus came to redeem it.  By embracing the secret knowledge of Jesus, adherents could escape the clutches of the Demiurge and be redeemed.

It’s hard not to see this in parts of the Sanders movement.  Those of us who find ourselves at odds with it are told that we must not clearly understand Bernie, for to understand is to believe.  And belief, we are told, will free us all as more and more people learn the truth.  Nebulous “elites” and “one percenters” are the forces of the Demiurge working in concert to keep our divine sparks shackled to the world of toil.  The DNC represents the party orthodoxy, interested in maintaining its monopoly on “truth” to keep itself in power. 

One can see vestiges of this in Trump supporters as well, which should be no surprise since the Tea Party emerged from another Gnostic sect, this one comprising Republican libertarians.  Like some latter-day Augustine, I can speak personally of this.  My time as a libertarian showed me many who again saw themselves as possessed of a special knowledge that would liberate the world, fighting the Demiurge (the Federal Reserve, the United Nations…take your pick) that sought to drag us all back in the muck.  If only, we were convinced, people would take the time to listen and think, they would come around.  It by no means characterized all libertarians, any more than it characterizes all Sanders supporters, but it was a prevalent strain in my interactions.

None of which should, by this point, be surprising.  If we are to take seriously the notions of politics as religion by other means, we should expect nothing less.  The battle is not over votes or over power, the players seem assured, but over the soul of America itself.


 *Christianity in the Roman world ran into trouble because it refused to play along, committing all three cardinal sins: it refused to participate in the imperial cult, it denied the gods of others and, at least in early generations, Christians abandoned the faith of their forefathers as they converted.  

13 December 2013

The Atheism Problem in American Politics



In an interesting new article on Politico, author and atheist Jennifer Michael Hecht suggests that the election of atheists is the last political taboo in the United States.  Part of the problem lies with American voters, who are less willing to vote for atheists than for members of any other group tested.  Indeed, no sitting member of Congress, and only a handful of politicians at the state or local level, is willing to self-identify as an atheist.  Hecht contrasts this with the situation in 19th-century America, or even early in the 20th century, when deists like Jefferson and Madison, or people of ambiguous or uncertain religiosity like Lincoln or Taft, could rise to the highest office in the land.  Since the Cold War, she argues, religiosity has been increasingly prevalent in American politics, bringing us to this current situation.

While I think the Cold War is an important touchstone, the issue of atheists facing roadblocks in politics goes farther back than that.  Though the presidents she identifies had non-conventional religious beliefs, they each paid at least lip-service to a higher power.  They were participants in the great American Civil Religion which, I have noted elsewhere, was an idea most associated with the late sociologist Robert Bellah.  It comprises a set of references to God that in theory unties Americans in higher purpose.  Ultimately the aim is to insure, as it says on the Great Seal of the United States, that “[God] looks with pleasure on our new order of the ages.”

So, we have “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, “in God we trust,” on our currency, “God Bless You; God Bless America,” at the end of nearly every political speech, “God Bless America” sung in the seventh inning stretch.  While the instance of these certainly increased with the Cold War, the putative deity has always been lurking in the background of American public discourse.  Indeed only one inaugural address, Washington’s second given in 1797—a marvel of efficiency, it is only fourteen words longer than this paragraph—has failed to mention God, or Divine Providence, or the Almighty Being.  Most sought his aid and protection for the nation, guidance in our affairs, and invoked his generosity towards the American people.

Small wonder, then, that atheism is a problem in American politics.  The charge was often hurled against Jefferson, and its inability to keep him from the presidency is more a testament to the state of party politics in the early 19th century than to general broad-mindedness.  Today the charge, were it substantiated, would be a political death sentence.  In eschewing belief in God, one opts out not only of formal religion, but of the American Civil Religion as well, and its relaxed central tenet that what one believes is not so important as that one believes.

A small consideration for atheists.  But not, it turns out, to most religious believers.  As I have discussed elsewhere, outward religiosity serves as a marker of trustworthiness for many believers.  There are reasons in deep time for this, stretching back to the very origins of belief in deities.  Belief in gods, it has been argued, arose as an efficient method for policing morals in groups.  Outsourcing this duty to deities was a good way to free up energies of members of the group towards the business of survival.  Outward appearances of religiosity serve as markers of membership in the group, that one can be trusted.

This even extends to very cosmopolitan societies.  Roman society, for instance, was as the historian Ramsay MacMullen noted “complete, and completely tolerant, in heaven as on earth.”  Religious authorities went to great pains to assimilate the gods of conquered territories to Roman gods.  Even the Jews frequently got a pass (except when they were actively rebelling), as the Romans respected the antiquity of their faith and chief among Roman religious virtue was adherence to the beliefs of one’s fathers.  Christians, however, were trouble.  They had left Judaism or—as Gentiles converted—traditional pagan religions, a most impious act.  Worse still, they denied the existence of all other gods leading to accusations of…wait for it…atheism.  Occasionally targeted for persecution, they were suspected of disrupting religious harmony and bringing the disfavor of the gods upon the empire.

When in the fourth century Constantine legalized Christian worship, he declared in the Edict of Milan that each person should pursue “that religion which he should think best for himself, so that the Supreme Deity (to whose worship we freely yield our hearts) may show in all things His usual favor and benevolence.”  This supreme deity would be the same one worshiped by educated pagans of the time, and would be adored, even by Christians, for the good of the empire.  Constantine’s restoration of goods and buildings seized from Christians in the recent persecution, and the financing of new church construction, was accompanied by investment in pagan temples, presumably in pursuit of his stated goal.  His attempt was to rehabilitate Christians of the charge of atheism and to restore the unity in heaven that had existed before.

So it goes even now.  Historically, of course, Christianity became a dominant force in the empire and in its successor states, and famously intolerant of competitors.   This intolerance was transmitted, in varying degrees, to the colonies that formed the United States.  Even though the Constitution stipulates that there be no religious test for public office, religiosity remains for many a marker of trustworthiness.  Is there nothing to be done?

Yes.  The same researchers who asserted this connection between religiosity and trustworthiness also note that reminders of secular governance can help ease the distrust.  Apparently, being reminded of membership in a larger group (e.g. American citizens) can downplay the “tribal” distrust of believers for non-believers.  I believe a version of this same phenomenon underlies the polarizing politics of the moment, which sees the unraveling of rights gains made by women and minorities.  Atheists do not appear to have the same problems in thoroughly secularized nations. 

Whether reminders of secular authority can convince atheists to trust believers more has not, to my knowledge, been explored.  One suspects the mistrust is returned, and for similar reasons.

However, the very fact that this mistrust can be mitigated suggests a path forward—secularism.  For those problems which have political solutions, in fact, secularism is the best answer for atheists and for believers.  It allows government to deal with religious and non-religious actors equally, and provides a middle path between theocracy and strict separationism.  It speaks to the aspirations not only of non-believers, but of the faithful who are wary of government entanglement with the personal questions of faith.  

It also requires respect.  Religious secularists must respect the right of the non-religious not to believe.  Non-religious secularists must respect the right of the religious to believe.  The goal of a society where all can pursue their aspirations is much more important than purity of belief (or non-belief).  Secularism requires a sort of philosophical laissez-faire when religious and non-religious people work towards common goals.  As far as is practicable—and there will be points where the groups simply cannot agree—secularism is a path we must walk together.  

There are several reasons for this.  Religious belief is not going anywhere, and the ranks of believers far outnumber non-believers.  Were we, as atheists and assorted non-believers, to engage only those with whom we agree, we would quickly notice that it’s always the same old people in the conversation and would achieve nothing but our own frustration.  Working with the faithful, we can build alliances with those who share our goals, marginalizing the reactionary forces seeking to impose religious strictures (ham-handed attempts at proselytizing the atheist message, at arguing believers out of their beliefs, do not help us in this regard).  

If any creed can join us, it is the message of equality contained in our founding documents and which has been the most contested idea in the public arena.  It is the concern for the future shared by all of us, religious and non-religious.  Secularism has been our greatest strength and can be again.  Embracing its value decreases the value of religious belief (or non-belief) in the political realm, making it possible for atheists to openly serve their fellows, in order to build a more perfect Union.

08 September 2013

The Pledge of Allegiance, Atheism, and American Civil Religion

When I was sixteen (or perhaps seventeen) I wrote a letter to the editor of my local paper, the Daily Press of Newport News, Virginia.  It concerned recent remarks in that paper concerning the necessity of saying the Pledge of Allegiance in remembrance of our forefathers who had apparently come to Virginia seeking religious freedom.  Of course, as a history student, I knew this was untrue, that the Virginia Company was first and foremost a company and that the original settlers were employees there to make a living.  

The Pledge was important at that time because there was a presidential campaign on, and George Bush (père) was making a big deal of it.  In a stunning rejoinder--this is my memory; I'll remember it as I like--I reminded the original commenter and the larger public of the historical fact, adding that many of the Founding Fathers were deists.  For the coup de grâce, I included the text of the original Pledge, written in 1892:

I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the Republic for which it stands, one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. 
I concluded the letter by noting that the phrase "under God" in the pledge had been added in 1954, suggesting that the original commenter was mixing things up.

The Pledge became my pet cause that year.  In a mock Congress, I brought a bill removing the phrase from it within one vote of passing.  This may have had something to do with the realization that, by neglect more than trauma, there was no longer room in my life for God.

Now, a quarter-century later, the Pledge is once again in the news, this time with a case in Massachusetts with plaintiffs claiming that the offending phrase "under God" is a violation of the Massachusetts state constitution which guarantees equal protection based on creed.  This is a new tactic; establishment-clause challenges have been declared non-starters as long as participation in the pledge is voluntary.

The current challenge has been brought by an anonymous atheist parent, who has argued that the phrase "under God" discriminates against his or her child by excluding the child.  David Niose, attorney for the plaintiffs (full disclosure: I have a passing, on-line acquaintance with Niose, which means we follow one another on Twitter and have exchanged a tweet or two), has argued that when the Pledge as it currently stands is spoken, atheists and, presumably, other children who may not believe in a single deity, "are denied meaningful participation in this patriotic exercise."  Further, he argues, the Pledge "validates God belief as truly patriotic and actually invalidates atheism."

This argument, which I think is probably the best one leveled against the practice of saying the Pledge as currently written, is interesting.  With it, Niose positions his clients as patriotic Americans whose chief desire is to have their children be able to say the Pledge with conviction.  Suggestions that the children simply not say the Pledge at all fall flat since standing up to peer pressure and the connivance of authority figures seems a bit much to ask of young children.

Of course, resistance is predictable.  Niose and his clients are not just striking at the placement of God in the Pledge, they are striking at the heart of what the late sociologist Robert Bellah called the American Civil Religion (ACR).

The ACR is a set of references and symbols, invocations of God, that serve to call our attention to the "higher purpose" of the nation and to remind us that political authority is grounded in the otherworldy.  They remind us, in a sense, that we are answerable in our political actions to a higher authority and that, when this duty is observed, that authority will look with pleasure on our new order of the ages as the Great Seal (not to mention the dollar bill) has it.

Bellah's contention was that ACR was invoked when politicians make ritual references to God in speeches, in the Pledge, and in the motto "in God we trust."  Such routine use had effectively neutered any sectarian content--Bellah was writing in the 1960s, when the tendency for politicians to wear religiosity on their sleeves was much less pronounced--and were, in a way, proof of how secular American culture had become.

Indeed, the insertion of "under God" into the Pledge bears out the ideas of the ACR.  Bellah quotes Eisenhower as saying "Our government makes no sense unless it is founded on a religious faith- and I don't care what it is" (emphasis added).  It was during Eisenhower's administration, as the Cold War was getting into full swing that the words were added.

As I have suggested elsewhere, when faced with an existential threat we, as a nation, have adopted stances to rally as many Americans as possible in support of the country.  Adding the words "under God" was one such action, though it assumed belief in the deity was somehow normative.  By this addition, the unspecified deity was enlisted in the American cause.  Americans, for their part, could find assurance that they had the support of divine providence, unlike the "godless communists" who opposed them.

The ACR, then, was a component of the American orthodoxy which, as much as any orthodoxy, functions to give form to what it means to be an insider and helps identify the outsider.

At their best, constructions like the ACR can provide a sense of unity.  This sense of unity is at its base a religious sense, but the ability to unify is one reason religion has persisted.  But in order to maintain its force, it requires an outside threat.  Once the outside threat is gone (in this case the "communist menace") the weapon itself remains, often to be wielded against internal dissidents.

This is what the plaintiffs in the Massachusetts case are up against.  They perceive the reference to God in the Pledge as invalidating their core belief.  Originally intended to unite, the words have become a wedge.  Their opponents wield the sword of ACR in an attempt to bring them back into line.  They will argue that this is a slippery slope, which will lead to the erasure of all mentions of God from the public square.  

Perhaps this erasure would be a good thing; it is not my purpose to argue that here.  Rather I would like to point out that the reference in the Pledge is fundamentally different from, say, references on coins or in political speeches in that it is a daily affirmation in public schools of the deity. 

In the Pledge case before the court, then, it seems that these facts are relevant: some Americans don't believe in God; requiring (or strongly encouraging) them to affirm belief in a higher power violates their rights of conscience; atheistic Americans are as American as anyone else.

Further, as we reflect on this, we should remember how the Pledge came to be in the first place.  It was written in 1892, for a nation not yet thirty years removed from the trauma of the Civil War and which was celebrating the 400th anniversary of Columbus' first voyage.  Francis Bellamy, the author, was a reform-minded minister, a socialist, and deeply interested in stressing American unity.

Bellamy did not find it necessary to invoke God to serve this purpose.

When God was introduced in those Cold War days, the introduction must have seemed necessary.  But the crisis that occasioned that introduction is gone.  We may soon reach the point--we may already have reached the point--where words once meant to unite have ceased to do so.

Which means it's time to change the words.  If the Pledge is to be meaningful, it must allow all Americans to say it honestly.  And it's not as though there's no precedent for change...