17 May 2014

State Religions, Clarence Thomas and the Incorporation Doctrine



"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
In the recent Supreme Court case of Town of Greece V. Galloway, the high court attempted to determine "whether the town of Greece, New York, imposes an impermissible establishment of religion by opening its board meetings with a prayer."  Such prayers had been initiated in 1999, before which for a long time meetings had been opened with a moment of silence.  Most of these prayers have been conducted by Christian chaplains and many have been overtly sectarian.  The majority concluded that prayers opening such meetings have been consistently held not to violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and that "[a]bsent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray and impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of the prayer will likely not establish a constitutional violation."  As long as participation is not coerced, the prayers pass constitutional muster. 

Reaction to the decision has been predictable.  Civil libertarians and committed secularists have seen this as the vanguard of a push to establish religion at the local level.  Religious sectarians have not been helpful in this regard, suggesting that the decision enables local governments to exclude minority religious groups from conducting such prayers.  Many, on both sides, are focusing on the concurrence authored by Clarence Thomas, which suggests that the Establishment Clause may not be binding on the states arguing, in essence, that states can establish their own churches.

This is not a new argument.  The Bill of Rights was, of course, an addition to the federal Constitution.  Its proposal was a condition of ratification for states like Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, without which the new nation would not stand.  Proponents of the Bill of Rights wanted it included because they feared that the strong central government built by the Constitution could too easily trample on the rights of citizens.  It was intended, therefore, as a bulwark against federal authority, not binding on the states.  Indeed, the Constitution binds the states only when it explicitly says it does.  For what other reason would states have found it necessary to include bills of rights in their own constitutions?

In matters of religion, the difference is easy to see.  History shows us that at the time of ratification, six states still had religious establishments of varying types.  Massachusetts' establishment lasted the longest, ending only in 1833.  This occurred, as associate Justice Joseph Story noted in that same year "without the slightest suspicion, that it was against the principles of public law, or republican liberty."  States voluntarily gave up their establishments.  So, while the federal government could not establish a religion, states were apparently free to do so.

What stops them from doing so now?  Primarily the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868.  It was one of the three so-called "Reconstruction Amendments" adopted in the wake of the Civil War.  The amendment sought to clarify the citizenship status of newly-freed blacks and to make structural changes to the Constitution.  For instance, the Three-Fifths Compromise, which had counted slaves as three-fifths of a person for apportionment purposes, was eliminated.  Rebels who had, while holding office prior to the Civil War, had repudiated their oaths to the United States and sworn allegiance to the Confederacy, were barred from public office.  And the validity of the national debt, which had exploded in the Civil War, was reaffirmed against critics.

Its most important and far-reaching provisions, though, are in the first section:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
This section, especially the language referring to abridgement of privileges and immunities, is the origin of what is known as the "Incorporation Doctrine," the name given to the idea that the protections enshrined in the federal Bill of Rights also protect citizens against state governments.  Beginning with the 1925 case of Gitlow v. New York, which argued that the freedom of speech contained in the First Amendment also prevents state governments from passing speech restrictions, most of the rights enumerated in the first eight amendments to the constitution have been similarly interpreted (or incorporated).

On the matter of establishment, Thomas seems to believe that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was intended to clear the ground for state establishments of the sort that existed in six of the original thirteen states at the time of ratification.  In his Town of Greece v. Galloway concurrence he argues that the Establishment Clause resists incorporation because it is an overt act of federalism and that the "Federalist logic of the original Establishment Clause poses a special barrier to its mechanical incorporation against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."  Throughout, he refers to earlier opinions he has offered to the effect that the Establishment Clause doesn't offer individual protection as does the Free Exercise Clause.

Regardless of whether his interpretation of the Establishment Clause as an instance of federalism is correct, we have to contend with this dangerous line of attack.  It relies upon the historical fact of state establishment and upon the common interpretation prior to the early 20th century that the Bill of Rights did not apply to state governments.  In fact, it shows how fragile the structures protecting individual rights against state governments are.  The Incorporation Doctrine is not a piece of legislation; it is not in the Constitution.  In a real sense, it exists only in the minds of jurists and in court precedent.

Thus it can be swept away, another precedent discarded into the dustbin of history.  What might the consequences be?  I think it will be instructive to use my own home state of North Carolina as an example.  Section 13 of the state constitution says of religious liberty:
“All persons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience.”
Leaving aside for a moment the implicit assumption that everyone in North Carolina will worship “Almighty God” (the language is strangely reminiscent of the 313 Edict of Milan…a topic for another post perhaps) note that there is no analogue to the Establishment Clause.  North Carolina's first constitution, adopted in 1776 and from which the first clause of the current language on religious liberty is drawn word-for-word, provided more protection:
"That there shall be no establishment of any one religious church or denomination in this State, in preference to any other; neither shall any person, on any presence whatsoever, be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to his own faith or judgment, nor be obliged to pay, for the purchase of any glebe, or the building of any house of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes right, of has voluntarily and personally engaged to perform; but all persons shall be at liberty to exercise their own mode of worship"
Of course, this anti-establishment sentiment is tempered with language declaring that 

"[N]o person, who shall deny the being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old or New Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with the freedom and safety of the State, shall be capable of holding any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this State."
This restriction lives on in the language from both the 1878 and current constitutions barring from office "
any person who shall deny the being of Almighty God," language apparently vitiated by the Supreme Court in the 1961 Torcaso v. Watkins ruling.  Hugo Black's majority opinion leaned heavily on the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education ruling which incorporated the Establishment Clause in the first place.  Such language still appears in eight state constitutions but is, presumably, null and void.

This could change if Justice Thomas' interpretation of the Establishment Clause prevailed, and the door, not only to state establishments, but also to religious restrictions on office holders, flung open.  Indeed, in last year’s session of the General Assembly, a bill was proposed that would have allowed the state to establish a religion, arguing that the Bill of Rights did not prevent states from doing so.  

It is for this reason that we have to take Thomas’ argument seriously.  There is a historical precedent, in the United States, for state-established religions.  There are people who want to return to that.  And the mechanisms that prevent it are in the hands of some who seem to agree.

07 February 2014

Thoughts on "Pluralism: the Future of Religion" by Kenneth Rose



In his interesting new book, Pluralism: the Future of Religion, Kenneth Rose, Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Christopher Newport University (full disclosure: I am a CNU alum and Ken was one of my instructors) argues that religious studies is in something of a crisis.  The theology of religions—which seeks to relate different religious traditions to Christianity and determine the relationships between these traditions, a notion in theory possible for any religious tradition based on revealed wisdom*—is, according to Rose, at an impasse.  Comparative religion, to which the theology of religions is necessarily prior, is similarly hobbled.

Theology of religions is at an impasse because current scholarship is based on a default position of inclusivism which, though it gives provisional value to non-Christian ideas, still has Christianity as its starting point and its normative model.  Though in form, this inclusiveness rejects the claims of exclusivity made by Christianity, Rose would have us see this as an illusion.  Such “inclusivism,” in his opinion, is simply a soft form of exclusivism, and no solution at all to the problems raised by the welter of competing religious claims. Since exclusive claims of truth are unsupportable in the modern world, this opens the door to pluralism, which has largely been rejected by the scholarly community as, ironically, exclusivistic. 

Pluralism, he suggests, sees “the availability of multiple bodies of internally plausible but malleable religious teachings as negating absolute claims for any of them.” (9)  Though he asserts that religions (note the plural) are attempting to understand something real, what he calls “an immaterial dimension of beatitude and deathlessness,” (12) the multitude of specific claims made by religious traditions, and the changes undergone by these traditions over their histories, provide sufficient reason to doubt that any one of them has the final word on the matter.  

As a counter to the older model of “cataphatic” pluralism, which simply piles attributes on to the sacred in order to make a more complete picture, Rose offers “apophatic” pluralism.  This views specific religious teachings as “a logical outcome of the cultural and historical conditions that necessarily limit every form of religious language.” (26)  It strips away all the symbols and attributes in favor of a direct encounter “with being, or the divine, free from the limited constructs generated by language, the mind, and culture.” (7)  Historical religions and their dogmas, in defining the sacred, necessarily limit it; each additional predicate attached to the sacred is a step away from experiencing it. 

Rose’s understanding of the historicity of religious traditions is very important to his argument, and is worth exploring here.  Though he rejects naturalistic theories of religions—such as those offered by David Sloan Wilson, Richard Sosis, and AraNorenzayan among others—which suggest that religion is an adaptation that aids reproductive success of individuals and helps bind groups together, his theory of religious change is evolutionary.  He further denies that the religious realm is accessible to the natural sciences at all and rejects compromise positions such as Stephen Jay Gould’s “non-overlapping magisteria” since Rose sees in reaity no “mental and physical dimensions that are entirely distinct from one another.” (153)

Religions change, according to Rose, as they come into contact with other religions.  Syncretism, which he suggests fosters hybridity and multiple religious identity, also dismantles old identities and creates new ones in a process he calls departicularization.  Through this process, apparently unchanging religious traditions are seen to change with exposure to new religious ideas and religious others.  It’s hard not to see them as organisms swapping genes, or perhaps memes, and becoming new.  Thus old religions pass on and new ones are created.  This is a process he sees intensifying as, through globalization, disparate communities are brought into closer and closer contact.

Recognition of this is important because, as Rose argues, “[i]f human societies continue integrating at the current pace, no religious tradition will be able to maintain nonnegotiable…claims except at the cost of cutting off solidarity with other human beings and by retreating into ever narrower and tragically doomed forms of fundamentalism.” (129)  It is here and in his writing on syncretism that Rose’s argument is at its strongest.  And no wonder—the very forces of modernity that are accelerating the processes of syncretism and departicularization are those that gave rise to the forces of religious fundamentalism, and its retreat into tribalism.  

I am sympathetic to much of Rose’s argument here, as the processes he describes as effecting religious change are not out of line with my own naturalistic understanding of religion.  We can disagree on whether there is a divine “real” behind all the appearances because we agree that, if such a real exists, it is inacessible to science and, ultimately, makes no claims about the natural world.  We can also agree that the religious traditions that attempt to describe this real, or that attempt to give the imprimatur of supernatural authority to natural processes, are products of history.  Both apophatic pluralism and naturalism reveal these as efforts to name something that is unnameable either because it is ineffable or because it doesn’t exist.  Which it is in the end is, ultimately, important only to individuals and not in some larger, cosmic sense.

But this agreement makes Rose’s rejection of Gould’s NOMA perplexing.  In proposing NOMA Gould sought to exempt the “moral truths” of religion from scientific enquiry and to exempt the discoveries of the sciences from religious scrutiny.  Science, as Gould said, gets“the age of rocks and religion retains the rock of ages; we study how the heavens go, and they determine how to go to heaven.” Gould, like Rose, would also deny any bifurcation between mental and physical realms, but conclude that both areapparent phenomena of the natural world amenable investigation by scientists.  But, so long as the claims of the mystic, or of the practitioner of everyday religion, do not extend to the physical properties of the universe, a NOMA-embracing scientist (or atheist) can say little about them.

Another point of concern is that Rose’s apophatic pluralism, while a powerful model for the academic study of religion, seems unlikely to have much impact among everyday religious believers.  Though undoubtedly correct in his assertion that “no religious community can preserve its language against change and decay forever,” (68) he also notes that those relying on authority and tradition will reject pluralist ideas.  

This, it seems, is where a large number of believers, at least in the Abrahamic traditions, live, in communities whose theologies range from conservative to fundamentalist.  Conservative theoogians will stress the authority of tradition and scripture, while fundamentalists will stress scriptures alone, interpreted literally.  Though there have always been liberal and conservative exegetical traditions, the encounter with modernity has given special impetus to fundamentalism especially in Protestant Christianity and Islam.  

That this fundamentalism is ahistorical in that it does not represent the normative experience of the majority of believers across time, and is entirely a product of modernity, is not understood by those embracing it. Fundamentalist believers live, as it were, in an eternal present, where the parameters of their religion as they understand it stretch back to the beginning of time and forward to the eschaton.  Historical forms of their faith, the majority of lived religious life, are viewed as defective forms at best, heterodoxy at worst.  Sectarian educational systems that turn out fundamentalist theologians seem unlikely to be touched by pluralist notions.

Indeed, the ongoing creative tension within even non-fundamentalist religious traditions between orthodoxy and heterodoxy seems to work against pluralism as well.  While syncretism is a feature of religions and not a bug, so, too, is the retreat into orthodoxy when confronted with novelty.  Heterodox ideas force proponents of orthodoxy to better refine their arguments and their dogmas, and build higher walls against outside encroachment.  Though their positions may represent a compromise with heterodox ideas, the guardians of orthodoxy will, like fundamentalists, maintain that their position represents a true transmission of the faith and is catholic in its reach (see, e.g., Henderson, The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy)

More’s the pity.  Rose has presented a view of religious pluralism that seems to cast a wide enough net to draw in all of those who believe, as he does, in a higher-order reality that is a source of meaning.  That it makes no demands of its believers, that it offers no insights into physical creation, that it is inclusive of multiple religious traditions while privleging none, makes it a true middle ground of faith. 

These same characteristics, however, seem to portend, at least for the non-mystic, an anodyne faith.  The very traits that render a religion unoffensive to non-believers may rob it of its snap for those who believe.  If we agree with Rose’s assertion that “as long as human experience remains marked by finitude, loss, and suffering, religions will continue to thrive in unforeseeable varieties among us, for just so long as it speaks about a condition of beatitude that escapes the bounds of death,” (149) then we should also assume that religious believers will be looking for concrete answers to these problems and concrete promises of the world to come.  So once again, the predicates come pouring out and the cycle continues.

* Thanks, Ken, for the note of clarification.

13 December 2013

The Atheism Problem in American Politics



In an interesting new article on Politico, author and atheist Jennifer Michael Hecht suggests that the election of atheists is the last political taboo in the United States.  Part of the problem lies with American voters, who are less willing to vote for atheists than for members of any other group tested.  Indeed, no sitting member of Congress, and only a handful of politicians at the state or local level, is willing to self-identify as an atheist.  Hecht contrasts this with the situation in 19th-century America, or even early in the 20th century, when deists like Jefferson and Madison, or people of ambiguous or uncertain religiosity like Lincoln or Taft, could rise to the highest office in the land.  Since the Cold War, she argues, religiosity has been increasingly prevalent in American politics, bringing us to this current situation.

While I think the Cold War is an important touchstone, the issue of atheists facing roadblocks in politics goes farther back than that.  Though the presidents she identifies had non-conventional religious beliefs, they each paid at least lip-service to a higher power.  They were participants in the great American Civil Religion which, I have noted elsewhere, was an idea most associated with the late sociologist Robert Bellah.  It comprises a set of references to God that in theory unties Americans in higher purpose.  Ultimately the aim is to insure, as it says on the Great Seal of the United States, that “[God] looks with pleasure on our new order of the ages.”

So, we have “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, “in God we trust,” on our currency, “God Bless You; God Bless America,” at the end of nearly every political speech, “God Bless America” sung in the seventh inning stretch.  While the instance of these certainly increased with the Cold War, the putative deity has always been lurking in the background of American public discourse.  Indeed only one inaugural address, Washington’s second given in 1797—a marvel of efficiency, it is only fourteen words longer than this paragraph—has failed to mention God, or Divine Providence, or the Almighty Being.  Most sought his aid and protection for the nation, guidance in our affairs, and invoked his generosity towards the American people.

Small wonder, then, that atheism is a problem in American politics.  The charge was often hurled against Jefferson, and its inability to keep him from the presidency is more a testament to the state of party politics in the early 19th century than to general broad-mindedness.  Today the charge, were it substantiated, would be a political death sentence.  In eschewing belief in God, one opts out not only of formal religion, but of the American Civil Religion as well, and its relaxed central tenet that what one believes is not so important as that one believes.

A small consideration for atheists.  But not, it turns out, to most religious believers.  As I have discussed elsewhere, outward religiosity serves as a marker of trustworthiness for many believers.  There are reasons in deep time for this, stretching back to the very origins of belief in deities.  Belief in gods, it has been argued, arose as an efficient method for policing morals in groups.  Outsourcing this duty to deities was a good way to free up energies of members of the group towards the business of survival.  Outward appearances of religiosity serve as markers of membership in the group, that one can be trusted.

This even extends to very cosmopolitan societies.  Roman society, for instance, was as the historian Ramsay MacMullen noted “complete, and completely tolerant, in heaven as on earth.”  Religious authorities went to great pains to assimilate the gods of conquered territories to Roman gods.  Even the Jews frequently got a pass (except when they were actively rebelling), as the Romans respected the antiquity of their faith and chief among Roman religious virtue was adherence to the beliefs of one’s fathers.  Christians, however, were trouble.  They had left Judaism or—as Gentiles converted—traditional pagan religions, a most impious act.  Worse still, they denied the existence of all other gods leading to accusations of…wait for it…atheism.  Occasionally targeted for persecution, they were suspected of disrupting religious harmony and bringing the disfavor of the gods upon the empire.

When in the fourth century Constantine legalized Christian worship, he declared in the Edict of Milan that each person should pursue “that religion which he should think best for himself, so that the Supreme Deity (to whose worship we freely yield our hearts) may show in all things His usual favor and benevolence.”  This supreme deity would be the same one worshiped by educated pagans of the time, and would be adored, even by Christians, for the good of the empire.  Constantine’s restoration of goods and buildings seized from Christians in the recent persecution, and the financing of new church construction, was accompanied by investment in pagan temples, presumably in pursuit of his stated goal.  His attempt was to rehabilitate Christians of the charge of atheism and to restore the unity in heaven that had existed before.

So it goes even now.  Historically, of course, Christianity became a dominant force in the empire and in its successor states, and famously intolerant of competitors.   This intolerance was transmitted, in varying degrees, to the colonies that formed the United States.  Even though the Constitution stipulates that there be no religious test for public office, religiosity remains for many a marker of trustworthiness.  Is there nothing to be done?

Yes.  The same researchers who asserted this connection between religiosity and trustworthiness also note that reminders of secular governance can help ease the distrust.  Apparently, being reminded of membership in a larger group (e.g. American citizens) can downplay the “tribal” distrust of believers for non-believers.  I believe a version of this same phenomenon underlies the polarizing politics of the moment, which sees the unraveling of rights gains made by women and minorities.  Atheists do not appear to have the same problems in thoroughly secularized nations. 

Whether reminders of secular authority can convince atheists to trust believers more has not, to my knowledge, been explored.  One suspects the mistrust is returned, and for similar reasons.

However, the very fact that this mistrust can be mitigated suggests a path forward—secularism.  For those problems which have political solutions, in fact, secularism is the best answer for atheists and for believers.  It allows government to deal with religious and non-religious actors equally, and provides a middle path between theocracy and strict separationism.  It speaks to the aspirations not only of non-believers, but of the faithful who are wary of government entanglement with the personal questions of faith.  

It also requires respect.  Religious secularists must respect the right of the non-religious not to believe.  Non-religious secularists must respect the right of the religious to believe.  The goal of a society where all can pursue their aspirations is much more important than purity of belief (or non-belief).  Secularism requires a sort of philosophical laissez-faire when religious and non-religious people work towards common goals.  As far as is practicable—and there will be points where the groups simply cannot agree—secularism is a path we must walk together.  

There are several reasons for this.  Religious belief is not going anywhere, and the ranks of believers far outnumber non-believers.  Were we, as atheists and assorted non-believers, to engage only those with whom we agree, we would quickly notice that it’s always the same old people in the conversation and would achieve nothing but our own frustration.  Working with the faithful, we can build alliances with those who share our goals, marginalizing the reactionary forces seeking to impose religious strictures (ham-handed attempts at proselytizing the atheist message, at arguing believers out of their beliefs, do not help us in this regard).  

If any creed can join us, it is the message of equality contained in our founding documents and which has been the most contested idea in the public arena.  It is the concern for the future shared by all of us, religious and non-religious.  Secularism has been our greatest strength and can be again.  Embracing its value decreases the value of religious belief (or non-belief) in the political realm, making it possible for atheists to openly serve their fellows, in order to build a more perfect Union.